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Government Involvement
in Chrysler Bankruptcy:
The Least-Worst Alternative?
By John A. E. Pottow

A
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s usual, my colleague Jim White has hit many nails on many
heads. Also as usual, however, I’m going to be a pain and part
ways with him a bit.
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First, was Chrysler’s bankruptcy “suspicious” in its use of section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code? You bet. Leaving aside the
proliferation of 363 sales to swallow Chapter 11 as we once knew
it, Chrysler was out in left field. Not only was it a “sale” of
everything meaningful in the company, it was to a seller—Fiat—
that put in no money. (To be fair, Fiat agreed to contribute
technological know-how on cars that Americans will now be much
more interested in buying than they were in a pre-financial
collapse environment.)
And GM was even weirder: Not only did the government put up all
the purchase money, but the purchaser wasn’t even a foreign car
maker with a plausible contribution of sweat equity; it was “new
GM,” a legal creation. GM bought its economic self from its former
self for no money down, all at the underwriting of the government.
So yes, that’s “deviant,” even worse than Professor White lets on.
But why the deviance? Was it to mask a nefarious government
plan of wealth redistribution? Before we analyze the propriety of
the government’s conduct, we must consider why it got involved in
the first place. And to do that, we have to understand basic
business reorganization financing. In a regular reorg, companies
turn to a now thick and sophisticated market of so-called DIP
lenders who provide funds to reorganizing “debtors-in-

possession,” as the struggling companies are called in the
Bankruptcy Code. In a regular Chapter 11, you’d call up commercial
lender CIT Group and ask for a multimillion dollar DIP loan (which,
rest assured, gets highly favorable treatment in bankruptcy law, so
don’t worry about the DIP lender’s risk). Thus, free marketeers
would say, “Fie on public intervention! Let the auto companies
fend for themselves, get a DIP loan, if they can, and reorganize the
same way anyone else would have to in Chapter 11.”
In the abstract, not an unfair point. But there was a problem, and
it was twofold. First, the car companies were huge and so needed
DIP loans that would be amongst the largest ever in bankruptcy
(orders of magnitude beyond the traditional case). Not
unprecedented, to be sure, but the size of loans that would need
at the very least a syndicate of banks to cobble together the funds.
Second, and more importantly, they needed the money in the
midst of a financial collapse of the lending markets. (By the way,
anyone see how that great DIP lender CIT Group fared?) So even
the starchiest libertarian would grumblingly concede that if there’s
a time for public intervention into the DIP loan market, this would
probably be it. It was a bold decision, but one that I believe will
be eventually vindicated economically. It’s not surprising that Mr.
Rattner’s Fortune article (see Professor White’s article) recounts a
4–4 deadlock of advisers confronting the President in deciding
whether to intervene with a loan.
Now the tricky part: You decide as a policy matter the feds should
step in and provide a DIP loan to the failing auto giants. How do
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you do that without nationalizing them? You do what they did:
Appoint an ad hoc task force with negotiating authority and
headed up by real financers, not government bureaucrats. They
drove hard bargains. They took an equity stake, because there’s
only so much debt financing you can tolerate in a reorg with this
capital structure. And they decided to do it through 363 presumably
for the reasons most 363 sales occur: for speed. (And speedy
these reorgs were—in and out in a month.) Viewed thus, the 363
sale structure had nothing to do with masking redistribution goals;
it was driven by bankruptcy reorganization strategy.
Now we judge in hindsight. Did they drive too hard a deal with
certain parties? Were they too soft with others? Maybe. Let’s start
with the secureds. Were the feds too hard on them, knocking $6
billion down to 2? (Let me be clear, I am assuming a proactive role
of the government as negotiator because, as with all DIP lenders,
they set the terms of when they’ll be willing to lend; so yes, they
get to set financial conditions.) I could try to weasel on this and
point to the consent of the trustee representing the consortium of
secured lenders, which bound the others, but Professor White
rightly raises the enthusiasm with which some of the TARPrecipient secured lenders might have wanted to help out the
government by being especially conciliatory.
The real question is: Are the assets encumbered by those lenders’
liens worth more than the $2 billion? No, as far as I’m aware, and
certainly no one tried to make a valuation argument—common in
bankruptcy litigation—to the contrary. In fact, some pundits
opined that $2 billion was generous, especially in the liquidation
scenario that would unfold absent government financing. (As a
sidebar, I disagree with Professor White and some courts that
suggest a secured creditor could insist on payment of the face
amount of the liens—more than $6 billion—to block a 363 sale.
I’m in the camp that reads the Code to say if $2 billion is all the
encumbered assets are really worth, that’s all a secured creditor
can expect in a 363 sale.)

The better raising of eyebrows comes
from the treatment of the UAW as an
unsecured creditor. Here, it ended up with
a relatively handsome stake in new
Chrysler (and GM for that matter). I don’t

agree that they got a $4 billion gift; at best they received a
disproportionately favorable stake in the new company. To this
charge of favoritism there is a technical argument of exquisite
legal positivism and there’s a better answer. The technical answer
is that “new” Chrysler can distribute its capital structure however
it likes, and so, for example, the Bankruptcy Code’s command of
equal treatment of unsecured creditors is inapposite (in contrast to
a proposed restructuring under a Chapter 11 plan). That explanation
is not likely to satisfy skeptics of why this was a 363 sale in the
first place; in fact, it will infuriate them and prove their underlying
mistrust.
The better answer is that even the Bankruptcy Code allows
departure from the injunction if the creditors are uniquely situated.
Here, there is a plausible argument that the union-creditor is
differently situated: One needs a happy union to continue making
cars at maximal efficiency, and it is not a far stretch to imagine
labor unrest scuttling any hopes for economic survival. Thus, even
if they had to defend the capital structure—which the positivists
would not concede—there’s a decent argument to rest behind
that this favoritism was perfectly appropriate (although Professor
White might brand it a mere fig leaf).
The $64,000 question is how much value added the union
contributed vis-à-vis the other creditors, and how does one
commensurate that into a premium in terms of the stake in the
new company? I don’t have an answer to that, nor do I have a
strong feeling whether a Republican-led auto task force (assuming
it embraced the policy threshold whether to lend DIP money in the
first place) would have come to strikingly different amounts. I’m
not so wet behind the ears that I envision no labor solicitude from
a task force emanating from this administration, but I’m also not
sure how much of an effect it actually had. I don’t think it was
tantamount to a $4 billion giveaway. (More thought is devoted by
Professors Roe and Skeel in an upcoming issue of the Michigan
Law Review.)
The big picture question for me was on
which side of the divide did this fall: a
government nationalization of heavyhanded policy guiding, or a reluctant
intervention of capital by the ultimate
lender of last resort? Contrary to popular
rumor, Representative Barney Frank did
not get to dictate which plants shut
down, and I don’t think the President
was very involved in picking Fritz
Henderson’s replacement at the helm of
GM. The jury’s still out, but history may
well judge this as restrained government
intervention in a time of financial crisis
that enhanced, not undermined, capital
markets.
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In all the gnashing of teeth that was the
appellate litigation (including brief
Supreme Court stays) trying to block the
363 sale, there was plenty of hand-waving
to alleged bias, sub rosa end runs around
Chapter 11 through 363, and statutory
interpretations of section 363. But there
was never a good, meaty argument that
$2 billion was not a fair valuation of the
secured creditors’ assets. As such, I weep
nary a tear for the purportedly aggrieved
dissenting secureds.
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